



## Russian Oil and Gas: Business Opportunities

The LUKOIL Vision


#### Russia's Crude Oil Reserves Still Underestimated




## **Just Getting Back the Historical Volumes**



## Russia — a Future Oil Supplier to the U.S.




#### US crude oil suppliers



Source: US Energy Department, IEA, WOOD MACKENZIE, LUKOIL.

## **Pipelines Capacities Grow Slower Than Production**



## **Alternative Export Options**

Export alternatives to Transneft pipeline system are railroads, river transport and commercial pipelines

The companies have to boost their exports via railroads and river tankers that increase ecological risks




Fire on river tanker in Samara (September, 2003)

Export transportation costs for railroads and river transport are significantly higher comparing to pipelines:

- Transneft \$10-12/tonne
- Murmansk pipeline \$20-24/tonne
- River transport \$35-40/tonne
- Railroad 45-60\$/tonne



### Russia — A New Source of Crude For the U.S.



### Russian Oil Exports — Unsecured




Storms in the Black Sea in December 2002 forced the terminal in **Novorossiysk** to stop the operations almost for a month




**Gulf of Finland (the Baltic** Sea) has been frozen in December, 2002 — January, 2003 resulting in 20% of working time loss

tonnes (2002)



2003 caused the dramatic fall of domestic crude oil price




Russian oil exports are unsecured:

- Strong dependence from consumers in Eastern Europe ("Druzhba" pipeline)
- Restrictions in Turkish and Dutch straits limit growth of exports
- Russian sea terminals strongly depend on weather conditions


Source: Petroleum Agrus.

# Caspian Oil Will Intensify Competition at the Traditional Markets for Russian Oil Companies



## «Buyer's Market» in Eastern Europe Will Strengthen


("Druzhba" Pipeline)




#### **Low Diversification Causes Losses**

Monopoly of "Druzhba" pipeline crude oil consumers and limitation of other export directions causes export revenues losses of up to \$2.3 bln pa (comparing to export through Novorossiysk)

\* Real prices in the middle of 2002.



Sources: Petroleum Argus, Ministry of Energy of Russia.



# The Murmansk Project Gives an Opportunity to Export Oil to the USA


#### Exports of Russian oil to the USA has not been profitable so far

• Unavailability of deep-water export terminals has not allowed for 270 thousand tons (2 million barrels) and bigger shipments. In this case savings on freight makes it possible to reach efficiency comparable with traditional supplies to the European market.


## The Murmansk project provides for an opportunity to profitably export oil to the USA and has advantages over other routes

- Murmansk is the only ice-free Russian port with a closed deep-water harbor allowing a year-round shipments of oil in tankers having 300 thousand tons (2.2 million barrels) deadweight and bigger
- The project's costs match any other projects with regard to the total transportation costs to the customer
- The project is expected to cover all of forecasted export capacity deficit in Russia

### Comparison of the Different Routes to Carry Oil to the U.S.



## Murmansk Pipeline Will Improve Russia' Export Exposure



st Taking into account distance and capital expenditures for Usa — Ukhta pipeline construction.

## **Murmansk Pipeline System Implementation Plan**


#### **PROJECT PARTICIPANTS**











## **LUKOIL Today**

#### Today LUKOIL is:



1.3% of global oil reserves and 2% of global oil production.



20% of total Russian oil production and 18% of total Russian oil refining.



The only private Russian oil company whose share capital is dominated by minority stakeholders



The 2nd largest private oil company worldwide by proven reserves.



The 6th largest private oil company worldwide by production.



The leading Russian oil business group with annual turnover of over \$15 bln.



The most liquid among Central and Eastern European stocks on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).




The most liquid oil stock and second most liquid stock overall on the Russian Trading System (RTS).




A leader among Russian oil companies for openness and transparency. The first Russian company to be listed on the London Stock Exchange.

#### Sources:


## Part of the World Premier League




## **LUKOIL's Global Operations**




## **International Upstream Activities**



## **International Upstream Activities**



# Rich Upstream Project' Portfolio – Strong Competitive Advantage



# Management Report – 1<sup>st</sup> Stage of Restructuring Program

In April 2002 LUKOIL launched a restructuring program to increase its efficiency

## Restructuring program: implemented measures

#### Revenue enhancement

- Increase exports
- Accelerate development of new fields

.....


#### Cost reduction

- Shut down marginal wells
- Cost control

#### **Corporate structure**


- Consolidate subsidiaries
- Divest non-core assets
- Centralize treasury and risk management
- Establish investment committee

## **Increasing Daily Output per Well – Reducing Costs**




## **Rising Efficiency of Upstream Operations**


#### Watercut of LUKOIL's oil fields



#### **Crude Production Growth**



# Reducing Crude Production Costs\* in Spite of Ruble Appreciation



<sup>\*</sup> Exploration and production costs, including lifting costs, maintenance and repair of expensed wells, insurance and other costs; excluding taxes and depreciation. Calculated in accordance with US GAAP data.

## Restructuring: 1<sup>st</sup> Stage Results – 2002

- The economic effect of marketing subsidiaries runs up to over \$50 mln provided by:
  - Group's income increase due to divesting the companies with low or negative profitability and return on investments;
  - Decrease of administrative expenditures.
- Economic effect of shutting down marginal wells accounts to about \$110 mln in 2002.
- Increasing refinery throughput and reducing domestic crude oil sales allowed LUKOIL to get economic effect of about \$240 mln in 2002.

 TOTAL ECONOMIC EFFECT FROM 1st STAGE OF RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM REACHED OVER \$400 mln

## **Restructuring Program Objectives for 2003-2004**

#### Restructuring LUKOIL's service subsidiaries

LUKOIL has over 35 service subsidiaries employing about 15,000 people (10% of Group's personnel)

**Financial sector** 



**Transport companies** 







Within 3<sup>rd</sup> stage of restructuring the Group will divest unprofitable, non-core companies and rely on outsourcing

## **LUKOIL's Development Strategy**

#### Short-term strategy (2003-2005)

- 4% average annual production growth
- To improve technology and systems of oil extraction, well-stream gathering, transportation and treatment
- To accelerate development of new oil reserves


#### Medium-term strategy (2005-2008)

- 5% average annual production growth
- 17-20% weighted-average ROCE in upstream
- Technology and equipment renovation in the Company's core oil producing regions
- Completion of preparatory stage and launch of commercial production in Northern sector of the Caspian Sea


#### Long-term strategy (2008-2010)

- To increase output: min (oil 2.2 mln b/d, natural gas 0.5 mln boe/d), max (oil 2.8 mln b/d, natural gas 0.65 mln boe/d)
- To control lifting costs (in constant 2002 prices and at \$/RR exchange rate for 2002): oil 2.0-2.5 \$/bbl, gas 0.10 \$/1000 cf
- To increase output from international operations to 15% of total production


### LUKOIL's Oil Reserves in Russia (PP, mln bbl)



### **LUKOIL** in Timano-Pechora




## **LUKOIL** in North Caspian




## Upstream Sector Outside Russia – Strong Efficient Growth

#### International diversification of upstream:


- Geographical diversification
- Strong natural growth of production
- Low lifting costs
- Attractive taxation environment




## LUKOIL's Export Infrastructure and Expanding Export Operations




## **Vysotsk — New Export Outlet**



## Aiming to Be Gas Producer #2 in Russia




## LUKOIL's Gas Reserves in Russia (PP, bcm)\*



<sup>\*</sup> Including natural gas and associated gas; Russian classification of reserves (ABC2 category).

## **Bolshekhetskaya Depression Gas Reserves**

- In 2001 LUKOIL acquired Yamalneftegazdobycha, which holds licenses for significant reserves in the Bolshekhetskaya depression
- 290 bcm of total P1+P2 reserves; management estimates total reserves of 1 tcm (including C1-C2 categories)
- Production is expected to start in 2005
  - First stage Nakhodkinskoe field
- Expected payback period 5-10 years
- Close proximity to Gazprom's fields and transport infrastructure (150 km)
- Preliminary agreement with Gazprom to connect the field with the trunk natural gas pipeline system
- At the advanced stage of development program at Yamal peninsula the partners plan to set up a 200 kbpd LNG plant





## **Strategic Objectives**



• Main objective — maintaining ROACE at the set level



• Aiming to maintain output growth rate above 5% after 2005



Export-to-output ratio – 70%



• Reaching and keeping production cost at \$2.0-2.5/bbl



Reaching average daily output per well at 12 t/d (88 bbl/d)



Targeting one fourth of Russia's total crude output by 2010



Targeting over 3% of the world's total output by 2010



To be natural gas producer #2, control 5% of Russia's total gas output